DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY
Company B, 158th Aviation Battalion (AH)
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
APO San Francisco 96383
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report
Commanding Officer
158th Aviation Battalion (AH)
101st Airborne Division (AMBL)
APO San Francisco 96383
Aircraft Incident/Accident - 12 November 1969, at 1335 hours, aircraft 67-17496
made an approach into an LZ vicinity YD 053633. The LZ was secure and
other log ships had been into the LZ prior to this aircraft. The aircraft
commander
intercepted a call for a medevac at the LZ. After picking up three
wounded the aircraft started to depart the area and was requested to return for
another seriously wounded soldier. Approaching into the LZ for the second
time the aircraft encountered small arms and automatic weapons fire. The
medevac patient was picked up and as the aircraft departed the LZ for the
second time, it encountered heavy automatic weapons fire and RPG's which finally
brought the aircraft down about 50 yards from the LZ. The aircraft was a
total loss as it burned due to subsequent enemy mortar fire. The gunner
incurred minor injuries and the other three crewmen sustained minor cuts,
bruises and abrasions. Of the medevacs on board, one was a KIA and the
other three seriously wounded.
JOHN E. WATTS
MAJ, INF
Commanding
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Company B, 158th Aviation Battalion (AH)(AMBL)
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
APO San Francisco 96383
8 December 1969
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report, Second Brigade.
Commanding Officer
158th Aviation Battalion (AH)(AMBL)
ATTN: S-3
APO San Francisco 36383
1. Combat Assault, 30 November 1969, 2nd Bde, 101st Airborne Division.
2. Company B, 158th Aviation Battalion was assigned the mission to provide
an Air Mission Commander for 19 lift helicopters and four gunships to lift A
and B Co's and a Recon Plat of the 2/506 Inf and A, B, and C Co's of the 1/502
Inf.
3. The assets available for the lift were 10 UH-1H helicopters from Co B,
158th Avn Bn (AH), nine UH-1H helicopters from Co C, 101st Avn Bn (AH), two
AH-1G helicopters, Co D, 158th Avn Bn (AH) and two ARA helicopters from B Btry,
4/77 Aviation Section.
4. The Air Mission Commander received a briefing from the S-3, 158th
Aviation, 2300 hrs, 29 November 1969. A crew briefing was conducted for pilots
of Company B at 0430 hrs, 30 November, with plans for the AMC and the gun ships
at Fire Base Birmingham prior to the lift.
5. The concept of operation was for 13 lift ships to extract Co. B, 2/506
Inf Bn from YD 585135 and insert them into a landing zone secured by Co A/1/502
Inf at YD 765093. As this lift was being conducted, six lift ships would
simultaneously begin an extraction of a Recon Plat, 2/506 Inf at YD 588038, and
transport them to Fire Base Birmingham. PZ times for both lifts were 0700
hrs. Each lift was to be escorted by two gunships. The second phase
of the operation consisted of 17 lift ships
picking up Co A, 1/502 Inf at YD 765093, moving them to Fire Base Birmingham.
Upon completion of this lift, phase three began with 19 lift ships extracting
Co A, 2/506 from YD 538106 and inserting them into an LZ at YD 737033 secured
by Co C, 1/502 Inf. Phase four was the final lifts with 11 ships picking up
elements of Co C, 1/502 Inf from YD 732088 and the entire flight of 19 ships
conducting an inflight rendezvous and proceeding to Fire Base Sally.
6. Initially, plans were for the 10 ships of Co B, to rendezvous with Co C's
aircraft at Fire Base Birmingham at 0600 hrs. and shut down while the Air
Mission Commander attended a final briefing by the Airmobile Task Force
Commander (CO, 2/506th Inf Bn) and staff. The Air Mission Commander would
then give a thorough briefing to all air crews involved in the mission.
At 0530 hrs., Co B's aircraft cranked and attempted a departure from Camp
Evans. Bad weather caused a delay in the launch and
the 2nd Brigade Commander placed the lift ships on standby until 0800 hours.
At 0800 hrs. the aircraft launched under marginal weather conditions. Co
B's flight landed at Fire Base Birmingham and the nine aircraft from Co C,
101st Aviation Battalion joined them shortly thereafter. The AMC attended
the briefing by the AMTFC and learned that the sequence of the mission changed
form that given at the briefing on 29 November 69. Three additional lifts
were added to the mission, plus the sequence of the lifts changed as well as
the number of aircraft required in each. The decision was made to launch
the aircraft immediately due to a break in the weather in the pick-up area,
therefore there was no time allotted to brief the flight on the changes or to
give the gunships and Co C's aircraft an initial briefing.
7. The mission was launched at approximately 0845 hrs. from Fire Base Birmingham
with 17 lift ships escorted by two ARA gunships proceeding to B/2/506 at YD
585135. The weather was marginal enroute and in the vicinity of the
pick-up area. The unit had not been notified of the lift and were totally
unprepared to be extracted. The lift ships had to be placed in orbit for
approximately 20 minutes. The area of orbit was confined due to the
weather conditions causing the flight to be
subjected to unnecessary hazards because of the delay.
When the ground troops were finally ready, the extraction
was made, and the unit lifted to YD 765093. At that location, A/1/502 was
picked up and taken to Fire Base Birmingham. A total of 19 sorties was hauled
for A/1/502. Upon completion of A/1/502's move, all 19 ships were used to pick
up A/2/506 at YD 538106 and conduct a lift to YD 737033.
Upon reaching Fire Base Birmingham the weather had
deteriorated to the point of a 100 ft ceiling confining the flight route to the
LZ, to the valley along the stream from YD 723092 to 737033. The AMC
determined that it would be disastrous to lead the entire flight down the
valley, therefore he gave instructions for the flight to set down at Birmingham
and he proceeded to the LZ.
The decision was made to lead the aircraft down the valley in
pairs, drop off the troops and pick up the troops to be extracted, and take
them to FB Birmingham. As the valley was cleared the next two aircraft
were brought in. A total of 12 sorties from C/1/502 was lifted from YD 737033
to Birmingham. While the slow process of two aircraft at a time was in
progress, three ships from Co B, were dispatched to YD 660077 and extracted one
platoon of D/2/506 to FB Birmingham.
While the lift to YD 737033 continued, the AMC took seven
ships of Co B, and made and extraction of B/1/502 from YD 732088 to FB
Birmingham. Upon the completion of the A/2/502 and B/1/502 moves, the nine
ships of Co C, 101st Avn Bn were released with instructions to make a final
lift with four ships from FB Arsenal to LZ Sally.
The AMC then took five ships and picked up a unit along the
road in the vicinity of YD 642093 and conducted a combat assault into vic YD
694067.
After that mission, six ships were placed on CA standby at
FB Birmingham, one released to return to Camp Evans and three assigned resupply
missions. The ACL on all lifts was five.
8. Problems Encountered - The weather during all lifts was such that
the risks involved should only have been undertaken in a tactical
emergency.
9. Results of Combat Missions - 30 November 1969.
a. 280 - Combat Sorties
b. 506 - Combat Troops Carried
c. 75+00 - Combat Hours Flown
10. Recommendations:
a. Marginal weather conditions should be given more evaluation and consideration
by the Airmobile Task Force Commanders in missions that are not tactical
emergencies.
b. The Air Mission Commander must be given sufficient time to give all pilots
a general briefing on an operation as complex as this one. Had the Air Mission
Commander been downed by enemy fire or been forced to leave the flight, the
entire operation would have been forced to halt until another AMC could be
briefed. This could very easily result in a small number of infantry
troops being left in a field location and subjected to an immediate assault by
a superior size enemy force. It is desirable to allot the AMC enough time
to follow the same troop leading steps as Infantry Commanders use in planning
operations.
JOHN E. WATTS
MAJ, IN
Commanding
SCRAMBLE
THE REDSKINS
Friday. 3 April 1970 marked the fifth day of heavy fighting in the northern sector
of Quang Tri Province, just south of the Demilitarized Zone. Elements of 1/5th
Mechanized Infantry had encountered a well-fortified NVA regiment and had
come under intense mortar file, 122mm rocket fire, .51 caliber machine gun and small
arms fire. Throughout the five days, Cobra attack helicopters from the 101st
Airborne Division and F-4 Phantom Air Force fighter-bombers provided close
air support for the ground troops.
The helicopter gunships destroyed numerous enemy positions in the face of heavy
.51 caliber machine gun anti-aircraft fire. One of the gunship units
providing particularly outstanding support was D Company, 158th Aviation
Battalion, 101st
Airborne division, nicknamed the "Redskins".
On the afternoon of 3 Apr 70, a Redskin fireteam, led by 1LT John Omer, was scrambled
from nearby Quang Tri to engage three .51 caliber machine gun positions.
The NVA still held the strategic high ground and were able to bring effective
fire against the friendly element. The Redskins arrived on station and
immediately began receiving heavy enemy fire. They returned deadly
accurate fire on the enemy gun emplacements and silenced one of the .51 caliber
positions before their ordinance was expended and forced them to return to
Quang Tri to re-arm. The Air Force then took over with two F-4 Phantom
jets and engaged the remaining two positions.
Perhaps it wasn't their day, or maybe "Charlie" was a little more
determined than expected, but the F-4 Phantoms were not having too much success
with the .51 caliber machine guns. Whichever the case, the call
soon came over the
radio, "Scramble the Redskins. The Fox 4's are taking fire!"
Only time will reveal the historic significance of that line for at least one
hot afternoon in northern I Corps, the Redskins reigned supreme.
Operation
Report, Combat Assault, Apache Snow - D Day + 9 in support of 3rd
Brigade, 19 May 69.
NARRATIVE:
1.
Company B, 158th Aviation Battalion (AH) was committed to support an airlift by
providing 10 lift ships of a 15-ship combat assault plus a command-and-control
ship for the operation. Both U.S. and ARVN Forces of approximately 1000 troops
from PZ (YC 363080) vic FB Airborne to LZ 1 vicinity YD 330004, and from PZ (YC405952)
vic FB Currahee to LZ 2 vic YC328965.
2.
No briefing was held by 3rd Brigade as to size, shape of PZ's or LZ's and also
as to the enemy situation. The Brigade S-3 Air NCO gave the locations of PZ's
and LZ's as well as the anticipated times for pick-ups. During the night the
lift was changed to a 1-12-2.
3.
The C&C picked up the C&C crew of 2/501 at FB Airborne at 0655. It was
at this time that a visual recon was made to determine the actual LZ and where
the artillery and air prep would be made. This caused a delay in the PZ time of
1+00 till 0830.
4.
B Company left Lancer Pad at 190805 and arrived at PZ at 0825 to start pick-up
of the initial troop insertion. At 0850 aircraft 67-17654 had a severe blade
strike in the one-ship PZ and landed at FB Airborne. At 0900 aircraft 67-17659
upon lifting out of PZ had an engine failure and suspected short shaft failure.
The aircraft was turned to the right knocking off the tail boom and crashed
back into the PZ with no injuries to the crew. The aircraft was total loss, and
the PZ was completely engulfed with debris. If the PZ was properly prepared the
aircraft could have make a safe landing without its destruction.
5.
The nine ships that were troop loaded were sent back to Birmingham to refuel, shutdown
and wait further instructions. It took over three and a half hours to have the
two downed ships slung out by Chinooks.
6.
The C&C ship was diverted to start the CA #2 from FB Currahee (540 ARVN
Troops) to LZ 2 with a PZ time of 1330. The lift was completed at 1530.
7.
The C&C ship then returned to start lift #1 with the addition of four Kingsman
aircraft and with one of the Lancer ships being diverted to a logistic mission.
The lift was completed without any further incident at 1740 hrs.
8.
Results, Operation Apache Snow D Day + 9
189
- Sorties flown
840-Combat
Troops inserted (2/501, 3/ARVN)
78+00
- Combat flying hours.
TOMMY W THORNTON
MAJ ARTY