158th/101st Vietnam from the NATIONAL ARCHIVES:
[transcribed by John Donaldson (Lancer14) from documents obtained
from the National Archives]
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Company B, 158th Aviation Battalion (AH) (AMBL)
101st Airborne Division (AMBL)
APO San Francisco 96383
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report
Commanding Officer
158th Aviation Battalion (AH) (AMBL)
101st Airborne Division (AMBL)
APO San Francisco 96383
Aircraft Incidents/Accidents- 23 October 1969 at 1605 hours Aircraft 68-16274
was in the LZ vicinity XD 935564 for the third time in an insertion for the
2/506. The aircraft had come in with five troops on board and was hovering
in
the LZ when the troops started to exit the aircraft. The helicopter rocked
from
the unstable C.G. and caught on a stump which unbalanced the aircraft causing it
to spin and crash on the left side of the ship. The four crew members suffered
slight to minor injuries and six ground troopers were killed from the flying
debris of the wreckage. The aircraft was attempted to be slung out but
upon
lifting of the bird the transmission separated from the fuselage approximately
100
meters west of the LZ from an altitude of 100 feet. The accident is under
in-
vestigation at this time.
JOHN E WATTS
MAJ, Inf
Commanding
[comments from Bob Duesenberry on the accident incidents report]
I was in the third helicopter when this one went down. Doc tried to land our chopper, but couldn't because he kept hitting tree stumps. They used a Cobra gun ship to clear the LZ with rockets. That's why the first ship went down.
After we saw we couldn't land at that LZ, Doc took the ship a
few
hundred feet down from the crash and tried to land in some elephant grass.
The rotors were pulling up debris from the grass and the crew chief and I
were trying to keep the five soldiers on board calm, because they had just
seen their buddies in the other chopper crash. While we were trying to keep
them calm, one of the guys jumped out of our chopper and broke his back. Doc
found a safe place to land to allow the other guys to get out.
We took the crew of the first downed helicopter out of the LZ.
Then went
back to pick up the injured soldier who had jumped out of our chopper. We
took him to a hospital ship on the China Sea. It was a challenge to land
because of the swells. While we tried to land, the ship would come up to meet
us. Finally we landed and we got the soldier off the chopper. Then we were
called to go back to pick up the five bodies and take them to the area were
they received the body bags.
If there is anyone who remembers this event and knows who the
right
seater was (a Lt.) and the crew chief was (all I know is that he was from
Texas), please send me their names and any info on them.
[follow up from Ken Webb]
I'm confused....did the crash happen because of the tree stumps
in the
LZ or because of the Cobra's rockets? Please clarify this.
Also, The hospital ship was the "USS SANCTUARY". I went
out there on an
OH-6 when I was with the Redskins. We had five or six on board....me and
another guy were hanging out the back doors. As we approached the ship I
saw a landing officer (?) come out on deck with those little paddles. He
was giving signals but the pilot was ignoring them. On short final the guy
waved us off but the pilot continued the approach. At the last minute the
paddle guy took a flying jump off the side into a net (I guess he was sure
we would crash....I wasn't so sure myself). When we landed the guy
re-appeared near the pad...he was giving a bunch of those "finger
signals"
and threw the paddles so they bounced off the deck....he was pissed! Then,
an officer came out and reamed the pilots behind....hadn't seen anything
like that since flight school....then another officer started screaming at
us about sidearms (no weapons allowed on a hospital ship)....geez. The
trip
was a success though....we invited the ships staff and a flock of nurses
(female of course) to the Redskin Lounge for a big (formal) dinner party
(our CO was a ring knocker from West point...still is). They did have a
large party on some future date. All I can recall about it was it was
raining heavy ( a toad strangler) and I had just returned from a very long
and tiring combat mission....I was beat. After a post/pre-flight I entered
our club....there were actually table clothes, candles....all the Navy folks
were in....get this....dress whites!!! Remember any of this Steve?
[Bob's reply]
The tree stumps caused the crash, but it was a sorry way to
clear the LZ
with rockets from a cobra gun ship. Thanks for the info on the hospital
ship. I didn't know the name of the ship. I was too busy watching the pilot
trying to land the chopper as the ship was coming up to us. He was a hell of
a good pilot to land that chopper on that ship.
WEEKLY AFTER ACTION REPORT 30 Nov - 5 Dec 69
D Co, 158th Avn Bn logged missions in the support of the 3rd Bde and
1/5th Mech for the week of Nov 30 to Dec 5.
We flew a total of 20.2 hrs for A Co. Three missions and 18 sorties
were flown in support of Umpire 90. The light fire team provided
negative suppressive fire. There was another 12 missions and 16
sorties in LZ preps and extraction's. Ammo expended was 26, 2.75"
rockets, 5400 rds of 7.62 mm, and 350 rds of 40mm.
D Co flew 32.9 hrs, 31 mission, and 64 sorties for B Co. There was
86, 2.75" rockets, 7500 rounds of minigun, and 615 rounds of 40mm
expended in 6 LZ preps.
For C Co, Delta Co flew 9 missions and 18 sorties. There was 10.1
hours logged in one LZ prep and 2 extraction's.
D Co, 158th Avn Bn flew 41 hours this past week for 15th Mech, with
46 missions and 102 sorties. Cpt Schrader's light fire team extracted
one Killer team and inserted two 6 man teams, all with negative enemy
contact. Two LZ's also were prepped. WO1 Lamiell's team killed 5 NVA
in heavy contact near the DMZ. CW2 Ishamael's team also had heavy
contact supporting the 1/5th Mec, killing 5 NVA, 1 bunker destroyed,
and 1 APC and 4 bunkers damaged. Total ammo expended was 153, 2.75"
rockets, 14,900 rds of 7.62, and 350 rds of 40mm in support of 1/5th
Mech.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
PostScript from Donaldson.
[Here are the numbers from the D Co report added for this one week
of Gunship duty.
hours sorties missions 2.75" 7.62mm
40mm
Support of A Co 20.2
16 3
26 5400
350
Support of B Co 32.9
64 31
86 7500
615
Support of C Co 10.1
18 9
?
?
?
Support of 1/5 Mech 41 102
46 153 14,900
350
TOTAL
104.2 200 89
265 27,800 1,315
Preface by Donaldson: This report had no date year. Research
shows it was most
very likely 1969.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Company B, 158th Aviation Battalion (AH) (AMBL)
101st Airborne Division (AMBL)
APO San Francisco 96383
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report
Commanding Officer
158th Aviation Battalion (AH) (AMBL)
101st Airborne Division (AMBL)
APO San Francisco 96383
Aircraft Incident/Accident- 13 October at 1245 hours Aircraft 66-16869 made
an approach into a LZ vicinity XD 9661. The LZ was secured and other ships
had been in prior to this aircraft. A normal approach was made with a touch
down to the ground. A piece of log and other debris in the LZ was thrown
into
the air from the down wash of the helicopters rotor system. One of the
pieces
of FOD hit the tail rotor causing the aircraft to spin. The tail boom was
sev-
ered from the main fuselage due to the tail boom hitting several trees.
The
main fuselage continued to roll down the embankment away from the LZ throwing
out all
the combat troops as well as the crew chief and gunner. The wreckage came
to
rest about 100 meters from the LZ with the aircraft commander and pilot still
inside. Within minutes the A/C and pilot were pulled from the aircraft,
which had
caught fire and was totally destroyed to include the KY 28 #8773 on board.
The
accident is under investigation.
JOHN E WATTS
MAJ, Inf
COMMANDING
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Company B, 158th Aviation Battalion (AH) (AMBL)
101st Airborne Division (AMBL)
APO San Francisco 96383
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report
Commanding Officer
158th Aviation Battalion (AH) (AMBL)
101st Airborne Division (AMBL)
APO San Francisco 96383
Aircraft Incidents/Accidents- 17 October 1969 at 1150 hours Aircraft 68-15628
was making an approach to an LZ. The LZ was unprepared which required hovering
out of ground effect at an altitude of 50 feet approximately. On final approach
with a speed of 20-25 knots, the RPM bled off to 5800 RPM rapidly and then
slowly
decreased further. The aircraft commander turned to the left and saw an
opening
on the ridge line about 100 meters from the LZ. The aircraft settled into
the
trees causing extensive main rotor damage, sudden stoppage damage and hard land-
ing. All four crew members and six combat troops had no injuries.
The aircraft
is suspected of having a low side governor failure. As of this writing it
has
been discovered that the 42 degree box did take a round through it and is being
analyzed for the possible cause of the mishap. The helicopter was slung
out
of the LZ and returned to B/5 Tam for investigation and repair.
JOHN E WATTS
MAJ, Inf
Commanding
This document was typed originally in all capital letters and included some
misspellings and grammar errors. I have transcribed it as it appears on the
original report. There may be some discrepancies between this digital version
and the original paper copy. Double line spaces indicate the end of one page and
the beginning of the next
----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 158TH AVIATION BATTALION (ASLT HEL) (AMBL)
101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96383
AVDG-AV-CE 25 July 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (Feeder Report), 158th
Aviation Battalion (Aslt
Hel)(Ambl), Period Ending 31 July 1970.
Command Officer
101st Aviation Group (CBT)
ATTN: AVDG-LC-C
101st Airborne Division (Ambl)
APO San Francisco 96383
In accordance with the 101st Abn Div UNCLAS Msg 070315 dated 100255Z jul 70,
Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, and Div Reg 525-4 dated
1 May 1970, the attached report is submitted.
ROBERT J. GERARD
LTC, Infantry
Commanding
A STUDY IN PLANNING AND FLEXIBILITY
RIPCORD
MISSION: UNITS LOCATED ON AND IN THE VICINITY OF FIRE SUPPORT OPERATIONAL
BASE RIPCORD WILL BE RELOCATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
AT 0900 HOURS 22 JULY 1970 THE COMMANDING GENERAL 101ST
AIRBORNE DIVISION
(AIRMOBILE) SET IN MOTION ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL EXTRACTIONS, CONDUCTED
UNDER INTENSIVE HOSTILE FIRE, IN THE VIETNAM WAR!
WHAT PROMPTED THE COMMANDING GENERAL 101ST AIRBORNE
DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
TO MAKE THE DECISION TO REDEPLOY THE FORCES SECURING FS/OB RIPCORD:
IN THE EARLY HOURS OF 1 JULY 1970, ELEMENTS OF THE 3RD
BRIGADE, 101ST
AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIRMOBILE), AROUND FIREBASE RIPCORD BEGAN TAKING DIRECT
AND INDIRECT FIRE. THE INCOMING ROUNDS WERE NO SURPRISE BECAUSE THE BUILD
UP OF INTELLIGENCE DATA OVER THE PREVIOUS WEEKS HAD INDICATED THAT THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE ARMY WAS MASSING FORCES IN THE AREA AND WOULD PROBABLY DIRECT
THEIR THRUST AT RIPCORD. THROUGHOUT THE DAY FIELD ARTILLERY, AERIAL ROCKET
ARTILLERY, AND AH-1G "COBRA" GUNSHIPS WERE EMPLOYED AGAINST KNOWN AND
SUSPECTED
ENEMY POSITIONS. HOWEVER, THE INTENSITY OF HOSTILE FIRE REMAINED HIGH AND
LATE
IN THE AFTERNOON A CH-47 HELICOPTER DELIVERING ARTILLERY AMMUNITION INTO RIPCORD
WAS HIT BY INTENSIVE 12.7mm ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE AND WAS FORCED TO LAND ON THE
FIREBASE. ATTEMPTS TO EXTRACT THE CH-47 WERE UNSUCCESSFUL EVEN THOUGH
HEAVY
PREPATORY AND SUPPRESSIVE FIRES WERE CONSTANTLY DIRECTED AGAINST THE HOSTILE
WEAPONS POSITIONS. EACH TIME AN AIRCRAFT ARRIVED AT OR IN THE VICINITY OF
RIPCORD IT WAS MET BY SMALL ARMS AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE.
THE PATTERN OF HOSTILE FIRE ESTABLISHED ON 1 JULY
CONTINUED FOR TWENTY-TWO
DAYS, WITH THE INTENSITY OF FIRE INCREASING DAILY. DURING THIS PERIOD THE
NVA
FORCES CONTINUED TO MANEUVER IN AN ATTEMPT TO ENCIRCLE RIPCORD. THEY
ESTABLISHED
ANTI-AIRCRAFT POSITIONS ON KEY TERRAIN FEATURES THAT GUARDED THE APPROACHES TO
RIPCORD AND REGISTERED MORTAR FIRES ON ALL PORTIONS OF THE FIREBASE, CAPABLE OF
RECEIVING HELICOPTER TRAFFIC.
DUE TO THE INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY, THE DEMANDS PLACED
UPON THE 101ST
AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT) TO RESUPPLY RIPCORD WERE TREMENDOUS. A ROUTINE
LOGISTI-
CAL MISSION HAD SUDDENLY BECOME A MAJOR TACTICAL OPERATION. DETAILED FIRE
SUP-
PORT PLANS HAD TO BE PREPARED AND COORDINATED; INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, AS TO
THE LOCATION OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT POSITIONS, HAD TO BE GATHERED AND DISSEMINATED;
FLIGHT SORTIES HAD TO BE PLANNED TO AVOID KNOWN OR SUSPECTED LOCATIONS; GUNSHIPS
CREWS HAD TO BE BRIEFED ON AREAS THAT WOULD REQUIRE EXTENSIVE SUPPRESSIVE FIRES;
FINALLY, DETAILED TIME SCHEDULES HAD TO BE PREPARED SO THAT ALL LOADS COULD BE
DELIVERED ON THE FIREBASE BEFORE THE NVA COULD REACT AND BRING THE FIREBASE
UNDER FIRE. THE EXECUTION OF THESE LOGISTICAL OPERATIONS TAXED THE SKILL
AND
IMAGINATION OF EVERY PILOT AND COMMANDER. HOW BEST TO OUTGUESS THE NVA
GUNNERS
WAS THE QUESTION OF THE DAY. THE ANSWER WAS EVIDENTLY EFFECTIVE BECAUSE
THE
159TH AVIATION BATTALION (ASH) WAS ABLE TO MAKE 461 SEPARATE SORTIES, DELIVERING
IN EXCESS OF 3 MILLION POUNDS OF CARGO TO FS/OB RIPCORD BETWEEN THE 1ST AND 22ND
OF JULY 1970, WITH A LOSS OF ONLY ONE CH-47 "CHINOOK" ON 18 JULY 1970.
THE
AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY INTENSIVE 12.7mm MACHINE GUN FIRE, CRASHED AND BURNED ON
THE FIREBASE.
DURING THE SAME PERIOD THE COMMANDING OFFICER 3RD
BRIGADE, 101ST AIRBORNE
DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) RAPIDLY DEPLOYED ELEMENTS OF HIS COMMAND AROUND THE FIRE-
BASE TO DENY THE NVA ACCESS TO THE FIREBASE. DUE TO THE SIZE OF ENEMY
UNITS
WITHIN THE VICINITY OF RIPCORD, HE WAS CONSTANTLY FACED WITH THE PROBLEM OF
EXTRACTING COMPANY SIZE UNITS AND INSERTING THEM AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS TO MEET
THE THREATS AS THEY DEVELOPED. THIS IN ITSELF WAS NO SMALL TASK, SINCE THE
AREA
IN WHICH THE UNITS WERE DEPLOYED WAS MOUNTAINOUS AND COVERED WITH TRIPLE CANOPY
JUNGLE. HASTY PICKUP ZONES AND LANDING ZONES HAD TO BE CUT IN THE DENSE
JUNGLE
BEFORE ANY AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS COULD BE INITIATED. AGAIN, DETAILED PLANS
HAD
TO BE DEVELOPED BY THE SUPPORTING AVIATION UNITS. IN PREPARING FOR EACH
OPERATION
IT HAD TO BE ASSUMED THAT THE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO INTENSE HOSTILE
FIRE ON APPROACHES TO THE PICKUP OR LANDING ZONES, THEREFORE PROVISIONS HAD TO
BE MADE FOR THE SELECTION OF ALTERNATE LZ'S IF THE FIRE ON THE PRIMARY LZ BECAME
TOO INTENSE. FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING FOR THE ESCORT AH-1G ATTACK HELICOPTER
HAD
TO BE EXTREMELY DETAILED AND CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH ALL GROUND ELEMENTS
BECAUSE
OF THE SHORT DISTANCES BETWEEN FRIENDLY AND ENEMY ELEMENTS. AGAIN DETAIL
PLAN-
NING AND COORDINATION PAID DIVIDENDS, NUMEROUS ASSAULTS WERE EXECUTED. IN
A
VERY
SMOOTH AND PROFESSIONAL MANNER, WITH MINIMUM LOSS OF AIRCRAFT AND CREWS.
IT
SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE DECIDING FACTOR IN THE SUCCESS OF MANY MIS-
SIONS WAS THE INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE OF EACH CREW MEMBER.
THROUGH OUT THIS PERIOD THE NVA WOULD MANEUVER THEIR
FORCES TO ENCIRCLE
RIP-
CORD ONLY TO BE MET BY A COUNTER MOVE BY ELEMENTS OF THE 3RD BRIGADE. IN
RETRO-
SPECT, IT APPEARED LIKE A LARGE CHESS GAME OF MOVES AND COUNTER MOVES.
FORTU-
NATELY THE 3RD BRIGADE WAS ABLE TO ANTICIPATE THE MOVES MADE BY THE NVA AND
RAPIDLY
SHIFT COMBAT POWER TO OFF SET ANY TACTICAL ADVANTAGE.
BY 21 JULY 1970, IT BECAME APPARENT TO THE COMMANDING
GENERAL, 101ST AIR-
BORNE DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) THAT THE COMBAT POWER REQUIRED TO DENY THE NVA THE
RIPCORD AREA WAS EXCESSIVE. DENYING THE ENEMY A PIECE OF TERRAIN THAT HAD
LITTLE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE TO ALLIED FORCES AND TIED UP A LARGE PORTION OF ONE
BRIGADE
AND DIVISIONAL AVIATION RESOURCES, WAS NOT CONSIDERED TACTICALLY SOUND.
THE
COMMANDING GENERAL ALSO BELIEVED THAT SINCE THE NVA HAD AN ESTIMATED TWO
REGIMENTS
MASSED WITHIN THE VICINITY OF FS/OB RIPCORD, THE ENEMY COULD BE MORE DECISIVELY
ENGAGED AND DEFEATED BY MASSIVE AERIAL AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT, AND BY EMPLOY-
ING THE FORCES IN HIS BASE CAP AREA DESTROY HIS LOGISTICAL RESOURCES AND DENY
HIM ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION
BASED ON HIS ESTIMATE OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION THE
COMMAND GENERAL 101ST
AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) MADE HIS DECISION TO REDEPLOY THE FORCES TO THE
VICINITY OF FS/OB RIPCORD.
ON RECEIPT OF THE MISSION TO REDEPLOY HIS FORCES, THE
COMMANDING OFFICER
3RD BRIGADE IMMEDIATELY DIRECTED THAT A PLANNING CONFERENCE BE HELD AT 221045
JULY TO DETERMINE TASKS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED, AND TO INITIATE PRELIMINARY PLANNING
AND COORDINATION OF ALL UNITS REQUIRED TO EXECUTE OR SUPPORT THE EXTRACTION OF
FORCES.
ON RECEIPT OF HIS MISSION TO BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE
AIRCRAFT TO SUPPORT
THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF MEN AND MATERIALS FROM RIPCORD AND VICINITY, THE
COMMANDING OFFICER 101ST AVIATION GROUP, DIRECTED THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE
158TH AVIATION BATTALION (AH) AND THE 159TH AVIATION BATTALION (ASH) TO MEET
HIM AT THE 3RD BRIGADE TACTICAL OPERATION CENTER AT 1000 HOURS. ON ARRIVAL
AT
THE 3RD BRIGADE, THE COMMANDING OFFICER 101ST AVIATION GROUP BRIEFED HIS
BATTALION COMMANDERS ON WHAT INFORMATION HE HAD ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING OPERATION,
AND ADVISED THEM THAT THEIR PLANS, TO SUPPORT THE AIRMOBILE TASK FORCE
COMMANDER'S CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION, WOULD HAVE TO BE DETAILED YET SIMPLE AND
WITH MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY BUILT IN. HE DESIGNATED THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
158TH
AVIATION BATTALION, AS AIR MISSION COMMANDER FOR THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND THE
COMMANDING OFFICER 159TH AVIATION BATTALION AS AIR MISSION COMMANDER FOR THE
EXTRACTION OF ARTILLERY AND OTHER HEAVY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT FROM THE
FIREBASE.
THE PRELIMINARY PLANNING CONFERENCE BEGAN WITH THE S-3,
3RD BRIGADE,
LISTING
THE TASKS THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED, THE APPROXIMATE TROOP STRENGTHS OF UNITS TO BE
EXTRACTED, THEIR LOCATION, AND THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF CH-47 SORTIES THAT
WOULD
BE REQUIRED. HE THEN BRIEFLY DESCRIBED THE FIRE SUPPORT THAT WOULD BE
AVAILABLE
TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION. PRIORITY OF FIRE FROM FOUR FIRE
SUPPORT/OPERATIONAL
BASES WOULD BE IN SUPPORT OF THE EXTRACTION. AIR STRIKES AND ARTILLERY
FIRE
WOULD BE EMPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT OF 22-23 JULY, DESIGNED TO FIX THE ENEMY,
TO REDUCE HIS CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE ANY UNIT, TO INFLICT MAXIMUM CASUALTIES
AMONG COMMITTED FORCES, TO DESTROY MAXIMUM MORTAR AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT POSITIONS
AND
TO ENABLE THE 3RD BRIGADE ELEMENTS TO DISENGAGE AND PREPARE FOR EXTRACTION.
HE
THEN STATED THAT, FOR PLANNING, THE EXTRACTION WOULD COMMENCE AT 0545 WITH THE
EXTRACTION OF SOME TROOPS FROM THE FIREBASE, FOLLOWED AT 0600 HOURS WITH THE
EXTRACTION OF ARTILLERY AND HEAVY EQUIPMENT. ON COMPLETION OF THE
ARTILLERY
EXTRACTION THE REMAINING TROOPS WOULD BE LIFTED OFF THE FIREBASE FOLLOWED BY
THOSE FORCES DEPLOYED AROUND RIPCORD. HE REQUESTED ONE COMMAND AND CONTROL
UH-1H HELICOPTER, 20 UH-1H AIRCRAFT FOR THE TROOP EXTRACTION, SUFFICIENT CH-47
AIRCRAFT TO EXTRACT THE ARTILLERY WITHIN ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS, AND SIX AH-1G
ATTACK HELICOPTERS.
THE S-3 WAS FOLLOWED BY AN UPDATE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
ON THE AREA OF
OPERATIONS. THE S-3 THEN REQUESTED THAT THE AIR MISSION COMMANDERS FINALIZE
SUPPORT PLANS AND BE PREPARED TO PRESENT THEM AT 1730 HOURS AT THE BRIGADE TOC.
AFTER THE BRIEFING, COMMANDING OFFICER 101ST AVIATION
GROUP, REITERATED
THE NEED FOR SIMPLICITY AND DIRECTED THE COMMANDING OFFICER, 158TH AVIATION
BATTALION, TO PLAN ON USING 30 UH-1H AIRCRAFT ON THE LIFT, TEN OF WHICH WOULD
BE PROVIDED BY THE 101ST AVIATION BATTALION (AH). HE ALSO INFORMED HIM
THAT
HE WOULD HAVE ADDITIONAL AH-1G AND UH-1H HELICOPTERS ON STANDBY STATUS IN THE
EVENT THE TACTICAL SITUATION NECESSITATED AN INCREASE IN AIRCRAFT ASSETS.
THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE AFTERNOON THE BATTALION
COMMANDERS AND
THEIR STAFF WORKED OUT THE DETAILS OF THE AIR MOVEMENT PLAN.
RECONNAISSANCE'S
WERE FLOWN TO DETERMINE ADEQUACY OF PROPOSED PICK UP ZONES, FLIGHT ROUTES WERE
FLOWN TO SELECT THOSE THAT HELD THE MOST PROMISE AND AVOIDED AREAS HAVING EXTEN-
SIVE ANTI-AIRCRAFT POSITIONS; START POINTS, CHECK POINTS, AND RELEASE POINTS
WERE TENTATIVELY SELECTED; S-2'S GATHERED INTELLIGENCE DATA FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON
THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY OF EMPLOYING ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS AGAINST AIRCRAFT
FLIGHT.
A LIAISON TEAM WAS DISPATCHED FROM THE 159TH AVIATION BATTALION TO RIPCORD TO
COORDINATE WITH THE ARTILLERY UNITS TO BE LIFTED.
AT 1730 HOURS THE FINAL COORDINATION MEETING WAS
CONDUCTED, MOVEMENT PLANS
WERE SUBMITTED AND AFTER MINOR MODIFICATIONS WERE APPROVED.
AT 1845 HOURS, S-3, 101ST AVIATION GROUP, DISPATCHED
THE PATHFINDER PLATOON
LEADER AND SECTION SERGEANT TO RIPCORD TO COORDINATE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL DURING
THE EXTRACTION. ON ARRIVAL AT THE FIREBASE THE PLATOON LEADER REPORTED TO
THE
"KING OF THE HILL" (INFANTRY BATTALION COMMANDER) FOR BRIEFING AND
NECESSARY
INSTRUCTIONS. HE WAS DIRECTED TO CONTROL THE EQUIPMENT EXTRACTION AND THAT
THE
PERSONNEL EXTRACTION WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY THE BATTALION TACTICAL OPERATIONS
CENTER ON THE FIREBASE. BASED ON THIS GUIDANCE, THE PATHFINDER PLATOON
LEADER
CONTACTED THE ARTILLERY BATTERY COMMANDERS AND RIGGERS AND DETERMINED THAT
ADDITIONAL RIGGING EQUIPMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO HAVE ALL LOADS RIGGED AND
READY PRIOR TO 0600 HOURS 23 JULY. BY 1945 HOURS THE EQUIPMENT LIST WAS
COMPILED
AND FORWARDED TO THE 101ST AVIATION GROUP TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER. AT
2030 HOURS TWO UH-1H AIRCRAFT ARRIVED AT THE FIREBASE WITH THE REQUIRED EQUIP-
MENT. AT THIS TIME, THE "KING OF THE HILL" DIRECTED THE
PATHFINDERS TO ASSIST
THE RIGGERS IN PREPARING LOADS FOR AIR MOVEMENT AND TO COMPILE A LISTING OF ALL
SORTIES TO BE EXTRACTED.
AT 222000 JULY, THE AIR MISSION COMMANDER MEETING WAS
CONDUCTED AT THE
159TH AVIATION BATTALION'S TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER FOR ALL PERSONNEL INVOLVED
IN THE ARTILLERY AND EQUIPMENT EXTRACTION. THE COMMANDING OFFICER 159TH
AVIA-
TION BATTALION (ASH) BEGAN THE MEETING WITH THE MISSION AND CONCEPT OF
OPERATION.
THE S-2 THEN PRESENTED A DETAILED INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING ON KNOWN OR SUSPECTED
ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPON POSITIONS AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE NVA CAPABILITY OF HITTING
THE FIREBASE WITH DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE. THE S-3 FOLLOWED WITH FLIGHT
PLANS,
THE FIRE SUPPORT AND REFUELING PLANS, AIRCRAFT PROCEDURES, MEDICAL EVACUATION
PROCEDURES, RECOVERY PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR STAND BY AIRCRAFT AND
COMMAND
AND SIGNAL REQUIREMENTS. BASICALLY THE PLAN STATED THAT 10 CH-47 AIRCRAFT
PLUS
TWO STANDBY AIRCRAFT WOULD BE STARTED, CHECKED OUT AND HAVE COMMUNICATIONS
CHECKS MADE IN ORDER TO BE READY FOR LAUNCH AT 230545 JULY. AIRCRAFT WOULD
DE-
PART BY ASSIGNED CHALK NUMBER. ON ORDER, FROM THE BATTALION TACTICAL
OPERATIONS
CENTER PROCEED DIRECTLY TO CAMP EVANS. CHALKS ONE THROUGH TEN WOULD LAND
AND
POSITION ON EVANS RUNWAY IN CHALK NUMBER SEQUENCE. CHALK NUMBER 11 AND 12
WOULD
POSITION ON THE C-130 RAMP AT EVANS. ON ORDER OF THE BATTALION LIAISON
ELEMENT
AT CAMP EVANS, AIRCRAFT WOULD DEPART IN CHALK SEQUENCE AT 45 SECOND INTERVALS
AND PROCEED VIA THE PRIMARY FLIGHT ROUTE TO THE FIREBASE (THE FLIGHT ROUTE WAS
LOW LEVEL TO USE THE TERRAIN AS A SHIELD FROM KNOWN ENEMY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS
POSITIONS). AIRCRAFT WERE TO REPORT STARTING POINT, ENROUTE CHECK POINTS,
RELEASE POINT, AND ANY TIME THAT FIRE WAS RECEIVED, TO THE AIR MISSION COMMANDER
ON AN ESTABLISHED RADIO FREQUENCY. AT THE RELEASE POINT, THE AIRCRAFT WERE TO
CONTACT PATHFINDER RIPCORD ON HIS FREQUENCY FOR PICK UP INSTRUCTIONS. ON
DEPAR-
TURE FROM THE FIREBASE THE AIRCRAFT WERE TO MAINTAIN ALTITUDE AND PROCEED TO
CAMP EVANS, CHALKS 1-9 WERE TO REPORT TO THE AIR MISSION COMMANDER AND PROCEED
BY THE FLIGHT ROUTE, PRIMARY ON ALTERNATE, FOR A SECOND SORTIE; CHALK NUMBER 10
WAS TO
REPORT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. AH-1G GUNSHIPS WOULD CAP THE FLIGHT ROUTE
INTO
RIPCORD AND PROVIDE SUPPRESSIVE FIRE ON CALL. IF AN AIRCRAFT WAS DOWNED
OFF THE
FIREBASE THE CREW WOULD REMOVE RADIO EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS AND BE PICKED UP BY
UH-1H. IF THE AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN ON THE FIREBASE THE CREW WOULD REMAIN ON
THE
FIREBASE AND BE EXTRACTED WITH THE TROOPS. NO ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO
RECOVER
DOWNED AIRCRAFT WHILE THE MISSION WAS IN PROGRESS. THE DECISION TO SECURE
AND
RECOVER AIRCRAFT WOULD BE MADE BY THE AIRMOBILE TASK FORCE COMMANDER AT THE COM-
PLETION OF THE MISSION. WOUNDED CREW MEMBERS WOULD BE DROPPED OFF AT CAMP
EVANS.IN THE EVENT AN AIRCRAFT WAS DOWNED OR A CREW MEMBER WAS WOUNDED, THE AIR
MISSION COMMANDER WOULD THEN LAUNCH A STANDBY AIRCRAFT FROM CAMP EVANS.
AT 222100 JULY 1970, THE COMMANDING OFFICER 158TH
AVIATION BATTALION (AH)
CONDUCTED HIS AIR MISSION COMMANDER'S BRIEFING FOR ALL PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN THE
PERSONNEL EXTRACTION PHASE OF THE OPERATION. THE MISSION WAS CLEARLY
DEFINED
AND WAS FOLLOWED BY A DETAILED INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING. AGAIN PARTICULAR
ATTENTION
WAS PAID TO THE LOCATION OF NVA ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS POSITIONS. THE
INTELLIGENCE
BRIEFING WAS FOLLOWED BY THE AIR MISSION COMMANDERS CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION. HE
ENVISIONED A THREE PHASE PLAN. PHASE I WAS THE INITIAL EXTRACTION OF
TROOPS
FROM
FIREBASE RIPCORD COMMENCING AT 0545 HOURS; PHASE II WAS THE EXTRACTION OF THE
REMAINING TROOPS FROM RIPCORD COMMENCING ON ORDER, APPROXIMATELY 0800 HOURS.
AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE HOOK MOVE FROM THE FIREBASE; PHASE III WAS THE
EXTRACTION
OF A COMPANY SIZE UNIT FROM A FIELD LOCATION APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER SOUTH-
EAST OF RIPCORD.
THE S-3 THEN BRIEFED THE DETAIL ON FLIGHT ROUTES,
ALTITUDES, ENROUTE FORMA-
TIONS, FIRE SUPPORT, COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS FOR ARMED HELICOPTERS, RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT, DOWNED AIRCRAFT PROCEDURES, TIME PHASING OF FLIGHTS AND AIRCRAFT
TIME
INTERVALS WITHIN EACH FLIGHT, AIRCRAFT REFUELING PLAN, PROVISIONS FOR MEDICAL
TREATMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS FREQUENCIES AND CALL SIGNS TO BE USED. FLIGHT
LEADS AND ALTERNATE FLIGHT LEADS WERE DESIGNATED FOR EACH OF THE TWO FLIGHTS OF
15
AIRCRAFT.
PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE FLIGHT ROUTES WERE ESTABLISHED
INTO RIPCORD AND THE
PZ IN THE VICINITY OF RIPCORD. EACH FLIGHT WOULD FLY IN A TRAIL FORMATION
WITH
THIRTY SECOND INTERVALS BETWEEN AIRCRAFT AND A FORTY-FIVE SECOND INTERVAL
BETWEEN
FLIGHTS. THE AMC STATED THAT IF ENEMY FIRE PERMITTED HE WOULD CLOSE THE
INTERVAL
AND PLACE TWO AIRCRAFT ON THE FIREBASE AT ONE TIME, BUT THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO
REDUCE EACH PILOTS ABILITY TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION TO AVOID ENEMY FIRE IF IT
BECAME
AS INTENSE AS THE INTELLIGENCE PICTURE INDICATED. THE EXTRACTION OF THE
PERSONNEL
FROM THE FIELD LOCATION WOULD, BE SINGLE SHIP BECAUSE THE PZ WAS NOT LARGE
ENOUGH
TO ACCOMMODATE MORE THAN ONE AIRCRAFT. THE AH-1G GUNSHIPS WERE TO ESCORT
THE
SHIP
INTO THE PZ'S PROVIDING SUPPRESSIVE FIRE ON "HOT SPOTS" ENCOUNTERED IN
ROUTE. ON
ARRIVAL AT THE FIREBASE THEY WOULD PLACE SUPPRESSIVE FIRES ON KNOWN OR SUSPECTED
ENEMY LOCATIONS. THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, TO INCLUDE GROUND COMMANDERS TO
CONTACT
FOR CLEARANCE TO FIRE, WERE SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL. SINCE ENEMY FORCES WERE
IN
CLOSE PROXIMITY TO SOME OF THE FRIENDLY ELEMENTS TO BE EXTRACTED, IT WAS
NECESSARY
TO KNOW THE EXACT LOCATION OF ALL FRIENDLY ELEMENTS. QUESTIONS WERE THEN
ANSWERED
AND THE PILOTS WERE RELEASED AT 2300 HOURS.
AT APPROXIMATELY 2300 HOURS THE 159TH AVIATION
BATTALION LIAISON TEAM ON
RIPCORD CONTACTED THE BATTALION TOC AND INFORMED THEM THAT THERE WOULD BE A
MINIMUM OF TWENTY-FOUR SORTIES TO BE LIFTED FROM THE FIREBASE, WHICH REPRESENTED
AT LEAST SIX ADDITIONAL SORTIES. THE COMMANDING OFFICER 159TH AVIATION
BATTALION
MADE THE DECISION NOT TO CHANGE HIS PLAN AT THAT TIME BUT TO HAVE THE AVIATORS
ALREADY BRIEFED MAKE ADDITIONAL SORTIES INTO THE FIREBASE.
AT 2345 HOURS THE DECISION WAS MADE BY THE COMMANDING
OFFICER, 3RD BRIGADE
TO REINFORCE THE UNIT DEPLOYED SOUTHEAST OF RIPCORD AT FIRST LIGHT ON 23 JULY
TO RELIEVE PRESSURE AND ASSIST THEM IN BREAKING CONTACT FOR THE EXTRACTION. ON
RECEIPT OF THIS ADDITIONAL MISSION, THE COMMANDING OFFICER 101ST AVIATION GROUP
(CBT) (AMBL) PASSED THE MISSION TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER 158TH AVIATION
BATTALION
AND AUTHORIZED HIM DIRECT COORDINATION WITH COMMANDING OFFICER 3RD BRIGADE. HE
THEN ORDERED THE COMMANDING OFFICER 101ST AVIATION BATTALION TO PLACE 12
ADDITIONAL
UH-1H AND TWO ADDITIONAL FIRE TEAMS ON FIVE MINUTE ALERT STATUS BEGINNING 0545
HOURS 23 JULY TO BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE THE 158TH AVIATION BATTALION IN THE
EXTRACTION OF RIPCORD.
ON CONTACTING 3RD BRIGADE, THE COMMANDING OFFICER 158TH
AVIATION BATTALION
THAT THE UNIT TO BE COMBAT ASSAULTED INTO THE AREA WOULD BE A COMPANY
SIZE UNIT, ANT THAT THE LZ WAS APPROXIMATELY 150 METERS NORTH OF THE PZ THAT HAD
BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR THE EXTRACTION. HE ALSO LEARNED THAT PHASE I OF HIS
PLAN
HAD BEEN ELIMINATED AND THAT THE INSERTION WOULD REPLACE IT.
AFTER FORMULATING A PLAN TO SUPPORT THE "ADD
ON" MISSION, THE COMMANDING
OFFICER 158TH AVIATION BATTALION BRIEFED THE FLIGHT LEADS AND GUNSHIP SECTION
LEADERS OF THE REVISED PLAN AND CHARGED THEM WITH BRIEFING THE PILOTS PRIOR
TO THE 0530 PZ TIME.
BY 0400 HOURS 23 JULY ALL LOADS WERE RIGGED AND LISTS
FINALIZED. THERE
WERE A TOTAL OF TWENTY-FOUR SORTIES TO BE AIRLIFTED FROM RIPCORD, AND INCREASE
OF SIX SORTIES OVER THAT ESTIMATED PREVIOUSLY. THIS INFORMATION WAS
RELAYED
TO THE 101ST AVIATION GROUP TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER SO THAT PLANS COULD
BE MODIFIED TO ACCOMMODATE THE ADDITIONAL SORTIES. TO FACILITATE CONTROL
THE
PATHFINDER PLATOON LEADER ESTABLISHED FOUR PICK UP PADS AND DESIGNATED MEN TO
CONTROL EACH PAD. PAD # 1, THE 105mm HOWITZER AREA; PAD # 2, THE CH-47 LOG
PAD
EAST OF THE BATTALION TACTICAL OPERATIONS AREA; PAD # 3, THE 155mm HOWITZER
AREA,
PAD #4, THE IMPACT ROCK AREA.
THE COMBAT ASSAULT COMMENCED AT 230545 JULY WITH THE
LANDING OF THE FIRST
HELICOPTER IN THE HASTILY PREPARED LANDING ZONE. THE LZ WAS EXTREMELY
HAZARDOUS
DUE TO ITS SMALL SIZE, LARGE SURROUNDING TREES AND A LARGE FIRE THAT HAD SPREAD
THROUGHOUT THE AREA. THE AIRCREWS MADE THE ASSAULT IN THE PRE-DAWN LIGHT
UNDER
INTENSE ENEMY FIRE, TO INCLUDE .51 CALIBER FIRE FROM A NEARBY HILL. THE
AH-1G
GUNSHIPS RENDERED THEIR VALUABLE SUPPORT BY ESCORTING THE SLICKS INTO AND OUT
OF THE LZ AND BY CONCENTRATING SUPPRESSIVE FIRE ON ALL ENEMY WEAPONS POSITIONS.
CREW CHIEFS AND DOOR GUNNERS ALSO FIRED SUPPRESSIVE FIRES ON THEIR APPROACHES
AND DEPARTURES, ADDING THEIR VOLUME OF FIRE TO PROTECT BOTH AIRCRAFT AND
PASSENGERS.
AT 0636 HOURS, PHASE I, THE INSERTION, WAS COMPLETE.
MEANWHILE AT 0550 HOURS THE COMMANDING OFFICER 159TH
AVIATION BATTALION
(ASH)
WAS INFORMED BY THE AIRMOBILE TASK FORCE COMMANDER THAT THE CH-47 MOVE HAD BEEN
DELAYED APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES BECAUSE OF A DELAY IN THE AIR FORCE TACTICAL
AIR SUPPORT. CONTACT WITH THE BATTALION LIAISON OFFICER ON RIPCORD
INDICATED
THAT ALL LOADS WERE READY FOR EXTRACTION AND THAT ENEMY FIRE ONTO THE FIREBASE
HAD BEEN LIGHT.
AT 0625 HOURS THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER RELAYED THAT THE
FIREBASE WAS READY
TO RECEIVE CH-47 AIRCRAFT. THE FIRST CH-47 PICKED UP ITS LOAD AT 0632
HOURS
AND RECEIVED NO ENEMY FIRE. THE FIRST THOUGHTS WERE THAT THE EXTRACTION
COULD
BE COMPLETED WITHOUT ENEMY INTERFERENCE. THIS THOUGHT WAS SHORT LIVED. THE
SECOND AIRCRAFT RECEIVED SMALL ARMS FIRE ON APPROACH AND THE SOUTHERN SIDE OF
THE FIREBASE WAS POUNDED BY MORTAR ROUNDS. FROM THAT POINT ON THE ACTIONS
AND
SKILL DISPLAYED BY THE CREWS AND THE INTENSITY OF HOSTILE FIRE RECEIVED THROUGH-
OUT THE REMAINDER OF THE EXTRACTION HAVE NEVER BEEN EQUALED IN ANY CH-47 HELI-
COPTER OPERATION. USED VIRTUALLY IN A COMBAT ASSAULT ROLE, THE AIRCRAFT
FORMED
A CHAIN THAT CONTINUALLY BRAVED THE INTENSE ENEMY FIRE TO ACCOMPLISH THE
MISSION.
IF AN AIRCRAFT RECEIVED HEAVY FIRE ON APPROACH, OR IF THE PAD TO WHICH IT WAS
LANDING WAS RECEIVING INCOMING MORTAR FIRE, THE AIR MISSION COMMANDER WOULD
BREAK
OFF THE AIRCRAFT AND DIRECT THE NEXT AIRCRAFT INTO ANOTHER PAD TO PICK UP A
LOAD.
THIS DEADLY GAME OF OUTGUESSING THE NVA GUNNERS AND MORTAR ROUNDS CONTINUED
UNTIL
THE 18TH SORTIE, WHEN AN AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY 12.7mm FIRE AND DOWNED ON THE FIRE-
BASE. AS PLANNED, THE CREW DEPARTED THE AIRCRAFT AND THE OTHER AIRCRAFT
CONTINUED
THE MISSION. SHORTLY AFTER THE AIRCRAFT WAS DOWNED, IT RECEIVED A DIRECT
HIT BY
MORTAR FIRE AND WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED. THE LAST SORTIE, NUMBER 24, WAS
EXTRACTED
AT 0745 HOURS AND THE CH-47 PORTION OF THE OPERATION WAS COMPLETE. LOADS
EXTRACTED
BY THE CH-47 AIRCRAFT INCLUDED 155mm HOWITZERS, MINI-DOZERS, COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIP-
MENT, AMMUNITION AND MISCELLANEOUS CARGO. EIGHT OF THE 10 CH-47'S EMPLOYED
WERE
HIT BY HOSTILE FIRE.
AT 0830 HOURS THE FLIGHT LEAD OF THE FIRST FLIGHT OF 15
UH-1H AIRCRAFT
ARRIVED AT RIPCORD. THE AIRCRAFT WERE SPACED AT 30 SECOND INTERVALS TO
ENABLE
THE PILOTS TO EVADE THE 12.7mm FIRE ON APPROACH AND THE MORTAR FIRE IMPACTING ON
THE PICKUP PADS. ON THE INITIAL SORTIES, RADIO CONTACT COULD NOT BE
ESTABLISHED.
SOME AIRCRAFT LANDED TO FIND THAT THE TROOPS WERE NOT WAITING TO BOARD BECAUSE
OF THE INTENSITY OF MORTAR FIRE, AND HAD TO HOVER TO A PAD LOCATED CLOSER TO THE
BUNKERS. BECAUSE OF THESE DELAYS, SPACING AND TIMING OF THE AIRCRAFT
BECAME
ERRATIC
AT THIS TIME THE AIR MISSION COMMANDER DIVIDED THE AIRCRAFT INTO FLIGHTS OF
THREE,
TO KEEP THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT EXPOSED TO FIRE AT ONE TIME TO A MINIMUM AND TO
GIVE THE PILOTS ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY. AS EACH FLIGHT FLEW INBOUND TO
RIPCORD
THE REMAINING FLIGHTS ORBITED OVER RELATIVELY FLAT TERRAIN TO THE NORTHEAST.
WHEN THE LAST AIRCRAFT IN THE FLIGHT REPORTED HE WAS ON FINAL APPROACH TO
RIPCORD
THE NEXT FLIGHT OF THREE TURNED INBOUND. THIS FORMATION ALSO ENABLED THE
AH-1G
GUNSHIPS TO ESCORT THE AIRCRAFT ONTO THE FIREBASE AND LAY DOWN THEIR DEADLY SUP-
RESSIVE FIRES MORE EFFECTIVELY. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THE GUNSHIPS FLEW
BETWEEN
THE LIFT AIRCRAFT AND THE ENEMY POSITIONS IN ORDER TO BRING EFFECTIVE FIRE TO
BEAR AND, IN SO DOING, PREVENTED SEVERAL UH-1H AIRCRAFT FROM RECEIVING HITS.
AT 0850 HOURS THE COMMANDING OFFICER 101ST AVIATION
GROUP (CBT) (AMBL)
DETER-
MINED THAT THERE WERE INSUFFICIENT LIFT SHIPS TO COMPLETE THE EXTRACTION IN A
TIMELY MANNER, BECAUSE OF DELAYS DUE TO HOSTILE FIRE. HE THEN DIRECTED THE
COMMANDING OFFICER 101ST AVIATION BATTALION TO LAUNCH SIX ADDITIONAL UH-1H AIR-
CRAFT AND A LIGHT FIRE TEAM TO ASSIST IN THE EXTRACTION.
THE ACTIONS OF THE PATHFINDER TEAM THROUGHOUT THE
EXTRACTION PLAYED A VITAL
ROLE IN THE SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION. AFTER THE DEPARTURE
OF
THE FIRST CH-47 AIRCRAFT AT 0636 HOURS, THE NVA BOMBARDMENT OF RIPCORD BEGAN AND
INCREASED IN INTENSITY UNTIL THE FINAL PASSENGER SORTIE HAD DEPARTED. THROUGHOUT
THE ENTIRE EQUIPMENT MOVE THE PATHFINDERS CONSTANTLY EXPOSED THEMSELVES TO THE
HOSTILE FIRE TO DIRECT THE LANDING TRAFFIC AND TO HOOK UP LOADS TO THE AIRCRAFT.
THE FACT THAT ONLY ONE CH-47 HELICOPTER WAS SHOT DOWN DURING THE EXTRACTION CAN,
IN A LARGE PART, BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE UNPARALLELED EFFORTS AND DISREGARD FOR
PERSONAL SAFETY OF THESE MEN.
WHEN THE INITIAL UH-1H AIRCRAFT ARRIVED FOR THE
PERSONNEL EXTRACTION, COM-
MUNICATIONS COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED BY THE INFANTRY BATTALION TACTICAL
OPERATIONS
CENTER ON RIPCORD. THE PATHFINDER PLATOON LEADER DIRECTED TWO OF HIS MEN
TO
ESTABLISH A RADIO SITE ON THE CREST OF THE HILL. COMMUNICATIONS COULD
STILL NOT
BE ESTABLISHED SO ONE PATHFINDER RAN TO AN AIRCRAFT ON THE PAD AND ASKED HIM TO
ESTABLISH COMMUNICATION ON THE PATHFINDER FREQUENCY. DURING THE TIME THAT
COM-
MUNICATIONS WERE OUT, THE PATHFINDERS DIRECTED EACH AIRCRAFT ONTO THE DESIRED
LANDING PAD BY THE USE OF HAND AND ARM SIGNALS AND ASSISTED THE WOUNDED MEN ON
BOARD. WHILE ACCOMPLISHING THIS, BOTH THE PATHFINDER PLATOON LEADER AND
SECTION
SERGEANT WERE WOUNDED. THE SECTION SERGEANT WAS EVACUATED BUT THE PLATOON
LEADER
CONTINUED TO SUPERVISE THE EXTRACTION.
WITH INCREASED CONFUSION RESULTING FROM INTENSE HOSTILE
FIRE, THE
PATHFINDERS
HASTILY FORMULATED A PLAN THAT GREATLY FACILITATED THE MOVE AND PROBABLY REDUCED
THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES. THE MAJORITY OF PERSONNEL WERE EXTRACTED FROM
PAD #2,
SO THE PATHFINDER PLATOON LEADER SELECTED THE CLOSEST BUNKER TO THE TOUCHDOWN
POINT AND THE FIVE PERSONNEL WHO WERE TO BOARD THE NEXT AIRCRAFT REMAINED THERE
UNTIL CALLED. AS EACH GROUP LEFT THE BUNKER FIVE MORE WERE MOVED INTO THE
BUNKER.
THIS PLAN REDUCED EXPOSURE TIME OF THE AIRCRAFT AND THE PERSONNEL BOARDING THE
AIRCRAFT. AT 1130 HOURS, THE PLATOON LEADER ORDERED ONE OF HIS MEN TO LOAD
ALL
SECURE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT AND BOARD THE NEXT AIRCRAFT. FIFTEEN
MINUTES
LATER THERE WERE ONLY 25 PERSONNEL REMAINING ON RIPCORD. THE INCOMING FIRE
HAD
BECOME SO INTENSE THAT FURTHER EXTRACTION FROM PAD # 2 WAS UNFEASIBLE, SO THE
PATHFINDER PLATOON LEADER DIRECTED ALL PERSONNEL TO THE "IMPACT ROCK"
AREA WHERE
THEY WERE SAFELY EXTRACTED AND PHASE II OF THE PERSONNEL LIFT WAS COMPLETED AT
1214 HOURS.
ON COMPLETION OF THE RIPCORD EXTRACTION THE UH-1H AND
AH-1G AIRCRAFT BEGAN
PHASE III OF THE OPERATION. THE PICK UP ZONES WERE EXTREMELY SMALL AND CUT
IN TREES APPROXIMATELY 150 FEET HIGH. THE AIRCRAFT WERE REQUIRED TO HOVER
DOWN
INTO THE PZ, HOVER OVER THE ROUGH TERRAIN WHILE TROOPS LOADED AND THEN MAKE A
VERTICAL DEPARTURE OUT OF THE CONFINED AREA. ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS THE
CREW
CHIEFS AND GUNNERS DEPARTED THE HELICOPTERS TO ASSIST TROOP LOADING. THE
GUN-
SHIPS PROVIDED CONTINUOUS SUPPRESSIVE FIRES FOR THE UTILITY AIRCRAFT WHILE THEY
PERFORMED THEIR DIFFICULT TASK, THE SUPPRESSIVE AND NEUTRALIZING FIRES OF
THE
GUNSHIPS WERE SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT THE ENEMY FROM DESTROYING A SINGLE UH-1H
AIRCRAFT DURING THE EXTRACTION EVEN THOUGH ONE 12.67mm POSITION WAS NO MORE THAN
100 METERS SOUTH OF THE PZ. AT 1401 HOURS THE LAST MAN WAS EXTRACTED FROM
THE
PICK UP ZONE AND THE REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES ON AND AROUND RIPCORD WAS
ACCOMPLISH-
ED.
DETAILED PLANNING, FLEXIBILITY IN EXECUTION, SKILLED
FLYING ABILITY, AND
UNCOMMON VALOR ON THE PART OF BOTH AIR CREW MEMBERS AND SUPPORTING GROUND PER-
SONNEL ARE THE INGREDIENTS OF ANY SUCCESSFUL AIRMOBILE OPERATION. RIPCORD
IS
THE PROOF.